Ten out of ten for Anatol Lieven, while Salma Yacoob is worth a few minutes thought.
Anatol ("Engage Muslim support or lose the war on terror", Financial Times, 13 July) writes:
"The response of Britain and its allies requires better intelligence and increased ruthlessness, but also greatly improved focus on their enemies – something that the Bush administration has not only failed to provide, but has gone out of its way to obstruct...
In portraying the struggle against Islamist terrorism as a war, the Bush administration is correct, and European critics who envisage it as a mere struggle against criminals are wrong. The key questions, however, are: 'What kind of war?' and 'How can it best be fought?'.
...the Bush administration has failed in its first and most obvious strategic task: that of splitting the opposing camp. By deliberately obscuring the differences between Sunni religious extremists, Arab nationalists, Shia religious parties, Iranian nationalists and Palestinian radicals, the administration has done the gravest disservice to America and its allies.
In place of a comprehensive diplomatic and political strategy, the administration, aided by Tony Blair, the British prime minister, has advanced the promotion of democracy. But there is nothing to suggest that democratic institutions necessarily act as a barrier to extremism, especially when to socio-economic weakness is added a sense of national humiliation".
(full text attached as comment to this post).
Salma Yacoob ("Our leaders must speak up", Guardian 15 July) writes:
"...what is undeniable is that the shoddy theology - no matter how "unIslamic" and easily condemned by most Muslims - is driven by political injustices. It is the boiling anger and hurt that is shaping the interpretation of religious texts into such grotesque distortions. Such extreme interpretations exist only in specific political circumstances - they certainly do not predate them, and the religious/political equation breaks down if there is no injustice to drive it.
This leaves British Muslims in a very difficult place. To bring in these wider questions requires them to dissent from the government line. This is difficult for them, keen as they are to avoid further marginalisation. However, if Muslim leaders succumb to the pres sure of censorship and fail to visibly oppose the government on certain foreign policy issues, the gap between the leaders and those they seek to represent and influence will widen, increasing the possibility of more dangerous routes being adopted by the disillusioned"
Salma Yacoob is right to say the arguments need to come out more into the open. It is only in that way that arguments that are wrong (as I believe some of the positions advanced by Respect to be) can be refuted through civil discussion, to the greater benefit and peace of all.
2 comments:
Engage Muslim support or lose the war on terror
By Anatol Lieven
Financial Times
July 13 2005
When a monstrous crime occurs, attention should focus on the perpetrators. The London bombers appear to have been British Muslims, but this does not explain their reasons for carrying out the attacks.
The response of Britain and its allies requires better intelligence and increased ruthlessness, but also greatly improved focus on their enemies – something that the Bush administration has not only failed to provide, but has gone out of its way to obstruct.
A network of Islamist extremists represents by far the greatest security threat to the west. Fighting it will require a very considerable redeployment of resources and restrictions on immigration and certain civil rights. The days when London could be called “Londonistan” must be ended for good.
The danger stems not only from future catastrophic attacks, but also from the possibility that terrorism could exacerbate tensions between alienated white and ethnic minority working class populations to the point where European democracy is endangered.
In portraying the struggle against Islamist terrorism as a war, the Bush administration is correct, and European critics who envisage it as a mere struggle against criminals are wrong. The key questions, however, are: “What kind of war?” and “How can it best be fought?”.
In the wake of the September 11 2001 attacks, many Americans treated such questions from Europeans as an impertinence. After the London bombings, any such attitude from Washington would itself represent the grossest insolence. If the British are to make serious sacrifices as a result of supporting US strategy, then it is essential that they have confidence in that strategy. They have to be sure that American actions in the Middle East will not unnecessarily increase radicalism among British Muslims.
So far, the Bush administration has failed in its first and most obvious strategic task: that of splitting the opposing camp. By deliberately obscuring the differences between Sunni religious extremists, Arab nationalists, Shia religious parties, Iranian nationalists and Palestinian radicals, the administration has done the gravest disservice to America and its allies.
In place of a comprehensive diplomatic and political strategy, the administration, aided by Tony Blair, the British prime minister, has advanced the promotion of democracy. But there is nothing to suggest that democratic institutions necessarily act as a barrier to extremism, especially when to socio-economic weakness is added a sense of national humiliation.
Promoting democratic development can be part of a strategy, but not if it is used as an excuse to ignore the other parts. Improved western security is essential and, in certain cases, preventive military action and assassinations directed at terrorist planners in the Muslim world are also justified. But in the end, defeating the terrorists, whether in the Middle East or the Muslim diaspora in Europe, is dependent on Muslim help. Gaining new Muslim allies is therefore a central part of any effective counter-terrorism strategy.
Ever since September 11 2001, Iran has been a potential ally in the fight against the Sunni extremists; but the present US approach to Iran has acute limitations.
By failing to offer serious incentives to Iran, Washington helped ensure the failure of the European attempt to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear programme. By trying to influence Iranians not to vote in restricted but still relatively free elections, Bush helped ensure a high turnout and the victory of an anti-American candidate. And by trying to block the planned gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India, the US is rejecting an opportunity to give Iran a greatly increased stake in regional stability and peace.
In the American intellectual establishment, there are now signs that the bloody quagmire in Iraq is leading to greater wisdom. To turn this into a radically different US strategy in the Middle East will be extremely difficult in terms of US domestic politics. But this is absolutely necessary if the US is to retain the ability – and the moral right – to ask British citizens to die for that strategy.
The writer, author of America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/a8b8c606-f3cb-11d9-af32-00000e2511c8.html
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